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Background: There has been renewed interest in the 
influence of affect on psychosis. Psychological research 
on persecutory delusions ascribes a prominent role to cog-
nitive processes related to negative affect: anxiety leads 
to the anticipation of threat within paranoia; depressive 
negative ideas about the self create a sense of vulner-
ability in which paranoid thoughts flourish; and self-
consciousness enhances feelings of the self as a target. 
The objective of this study was to examine such affective 
processes in relation to state paranoia in patients with 
delusions. Methods: 130 patients with delusions in the 
context of a nonaffective psychosis diagnosis (predomi-
nately schizophrenia) were assessed for contemporaneous 
levels of persecutory ideation on 5 visual analog scales. 
Measures were taken of anxiety, depression, threat antic-
ipation, interpretation of ambiguity, self-focus, and neg-
ative ideas about the self. Results: Of the patients, 85% 
report paranoid thinking at testing. Symptoms of anxi-
ety and depression were highly prevalent. Current para-
noid thinking was associated with anxiety, depression, 
greater anticipation of threat events, negative interpreta-
tions of ambiguous events, a self-focused cognitive style, 
and negative ideas about the self. Conclusions: The study 
provides a clear demonstration that a range of emotion-
related cognitive biases, each of which could plausibly 
maintain delusions, are associated with current paranoid 
thinking in patients with psychosis. We identified biases 
both in the contents of cognition and in the processing of 
information. Links between affect and psychosis are cen-
tral to the understanding of schizophrenia. We conclude 
that treatment of emotional dysfunction should lead to 




Both the conceptualization of schizophrenia and the 
understanding of its causes are undergoing significant 
change. Evidence is accumulating that there are multiple 
distinct experiences, including paranoia, grandiosity, 
hallucinations, anhedonia, and thought disorder1–3; each 
experience is on a continuum in the general population,4,5 
and patients with schizophrenia seen in clinical settings 
are the rare individuals at the severe end of a number of 
these dimensions.6,7 Although classification systems have 
maintained a core divide between emotional disorders 
and psychotic conditions, it is increasingly recognized that 
affect is actually key to understanding schizophrenia.8–10 
In this study, we take one salient psychotic experience, 
paranoia, and examine the presence of cognitive-affective 
processing biases likely to maintain the problem.
In our model of the formation and maintenance of 
persecutory delusions, anxiety and depression are given 
prominent roles.11 For example, anxiety is considered 
to cause the threat theme of paranoid thoughts and to 
lead to negative interpretations of ambiguous events; 
the effects will be enhanced by self-consciousness, an 
attentional focus on the self, increasing the sense of 
the self  as a target. More recently we have highlighted 
how worry can lead to more implausible and distress-
ing paranoid experience.12 It is not only processing styles 
that are important but also content related to emotional 
concerns matters. Paranoia is considered an extension of 
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negative ideas about the self  as vulnerable (see figure 1). 
The importance of depressive ideas about the self, nega-
tive self  representations, is also central to another promi-
nent account of persecutory delusions.13 Broadly these 
models are consistent with empirically established links 
of psychotic symptoms to emotional reactivity, trauma, 
and adversity.14–17 Anxiety and depression are separate 
basic emotions, both likely contributing to persecutory 
delusions, but there is a high degree of correlation and 
considerable genetic overlap, indicating a shared negative 
affectivity factor and shared psychological processes.18,19
These theoretical ideas concerning delusion and emo-
tion, typically derived from clinical observation, have 
received empirical support. A  large number of studies 
have found that anxiety and depression are associated 
with clinical and nonclinical paranoid thinking.20,21 For 
example, in a national epidemiological survey, partici-
pants reporting plots against them had 10 times the odds 
of reporting anxiety and 7 times the odds of reporting 
depression compared with people not reporting such 
paranoid thoughts.5 Innovative experience sampling 
studies with patients have found that increases in anxi-
ety predict the occurrence of paranoia.22,23 Experimental 
studies have shown that anxiety and depression predict 
the occurrence of paranoid thinking24 and that inducing 
anxiety results in an increased likelihood of paranoid 
thoughts.25 Convergent with these findings, psychotic-like 
experiences are more common in individuals with anxiety 
and depressive disorders.26 Thus, emotional disorder and 
paranoia are likely to be causally linked.
Understanding the link between negative emotion 
and delusions has led to an emerging literature on 
cognitive-affective processing. A form of anticipation of 
threat has been examined by Bentall and colleagues.27–29 
They found that patients with persecutory delusions, in 
comparison to nonclinical controls, are more likely to 
anticipate socially negative events that have a paranoid 
aspect occurring to them (eg, “Someone reads your 
mail without your permission,” “Someone stares at you 
menacingly”). A self-focused cognitive style, as assessed 
by the Self-Consciousness Scale,30 has been associated 
with levels of paranoia in patients with schizophrenia31 
and in students.32,33 Fowler and colleagues34 have tested 
the role of negative ideas about the self  in persecutory 
delusions. A cohort of 300 patients with psychosis was 
assessed at 3 time points over 1 year. Statistical modeling 
indicated that depressed mood and negative ideas about 
the self  predicted the strength of persecutory delusions 
over time, with only a weak effect in the opposite 
direction. However, as with all these psychological 
factors, a reciprocal relationship between affect, cognitive 
processing, and paranoid thinking remains plausible.
None of these studies have examined the affective 
cognitive processes in relation to levels of state para-
noia in patients. However, it is important in developing 
new interventions to target them by identifying process-
ing biases associated with current symptomatic experi-
ences. In this study, our aim was to take a large group of 
patients with delusional beliefs in the context of what are 
traditionally considered nonaffective psychotic disorders 
(schizophrenia, schizo-affective psychosis, and delusional 
disorder) and to examine for the first time the association 
of a number of affective cognitive processes in relation to 
state paranoid thinking. There were 3 hypotheses: current 
Fig. 1. The paranoia hierarchy.33
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paranoid thinking would be related to recent levels of anx-
iety and depression; current paranoid thinking would be 
associated with specific cognitive-affective biases (antici-
pation of mild negative events happening to the person, 
negative interpretations of ambiguous events being taken, 
a self-focused cognitive style, and negative ideas about the 
self); and these biases in individuals with delusions would 
be accounted for by the levels of anxiety and depression. 
We thus proposed to establish the presence of emotion-
related cognitive biases in individuals with delusions and 
link these to current paranoid thinking.
Method
Participants
One hundred and thirty patients with delusions from clin-
ical services took part. The inclusion criteria were the fol-
lowing: age, 18–65; International Statistical Classification 
of Diseases-10 diagnosis of nonaffective psychosis (F20–
F29); and a current delusion (rated ≥2 on the Schedules 
for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry),35 present 
for at least the last 3 months and held with at least 50% 
conviction. The exclusion criteria were a primary diagno-
sis of alcohol or drug dependency, organic brain disorder, 
diagnosed learning disability, or a command of English 
insufficient to complete assessments. The patients were 
recruited from 6 different National Health Service (NHS) 
sites in United Kingdom: South London and Maudsley 
NHS Foundation Trust, Norfolk and Waveney Mental 
Health NHS Foundation Trust, Camden and Islington 
NHS Foundation Trust, North East London NHS 
Foundation Trust, Barnet, Enfield and Haringey Mental 
Health NHS Trust, and Central and North West London 
NHS Foundation Trust.
Symptom Measures
State Paranoia. Five visual analog scales were used to 
assess state paranoia: (1) I am being deliberately harmed 
or upset; (2) I am being followed; (3) There is a conspir-
acy against me; (4) I am being persecuted; (5) I am being 
laughed at behind my back. For each item, participants 
rated how they were feeling “right now” from 0 (not at 
all) to 100 (totally). A total score was used. The internal 
reliability of this scale was high (Cronbach alpha = 0.86).
Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS).36  
The SAPS is a 35-item, 6-point (0–5) rating instrument 
for the assessment of the positive symptoms of psycho-
sis. Symptoms over the last month were rated. Higher 
scores indicate the presence of greater levels of positive 
symptoms.
Beck Anxiety Inventory.37 The Beck Anxiety Inventory 
(BAI) is a self-report 21-item, 4-point (0–3) scale for the 
assessment of anxiety over the past week. Higher scores 
indicate higher levels of anxiety. The cut-offs for the scale 
are non-anxious (0–9), mild (10–18), moderate (19–29), 
and severe range (30+).
Beck Depression Inventory-II.38 The Beck Depression 
Inventory-II (BDI-II) is a self-report 21-item, 4-point 
scale (0–3) for the assessment of depression over the 
past fortnight. Higher scores indicate higher depres-
sion. Birchwood et al39 report a high correlation (r = .91) 
between the BDI and the interview-based Calgary 
Depression Scale for Schizophrenia.40 The cut-offs for the 
scale are minimal (0–13), mild (14–19), moderate (20–29), 
and severe (29+).
Affective Processing Measures
Threat Anticipation.29 The format was derived from pre-
vious studies.27–29 Participants had to write how likely a 
list of negative, neutral, and positive events were to hap-
pen over the next 2 years to themselves and also to other 
people. Each event was rated separately for the likelihood 
that it would happen to the self  and to another person 
on a 7-point scale (“not at all likely” to “very likely”). 
We used 5 mild negative events that were not obviously 
paranoia-related (“Your physical health deteriorates,” 
“You will find it hard to express yourself  with others,” 
“You have too many responsibilities to manage,” “You 
have an accident,” “You cannot manage your finances”), 
5 neutral events (eg, “You receive a dental appointment 
in the mail,” “Someone asks you if  the seat next to you is 
taken”), and 5 positive events (eg, “You win a competi-
tion,” “You manage to save for something you want to 
buy”). This provided 6 likelihood summary scores: threat 
anticipation-self, neutral anticipation-self, positive antic-
ipation-self, threat anticipation-other, neutral anticipa-
tion-other, and positive anticipation-other. Higher scores 
indicate higher estimates of likelihood.
Interpretation of Ambiguity.41 In this task 10 ambiguous 
scenarios are presented to participants, and respondents 
answer yes or no to a possible explanation. For example, 
You go to a party at a club. While dancing, you spot an 
old friend not far away and call out. They do not reply, 
and after a moment, turn and leave the dance floor, head-
ing for the bar. You don’t call out again because it is too 
noisy. Was your friend ignoring you in the club? (Yes/No). 
Other scenarios concern, eg, giving a presentation, doing 
a DIY project, and first impressions. Higher scores indi-
cate greater endorsement of negative interpretations of 
the ambiguous events.
Self-Consciousness Scale.30 The Self-Consciousness Scale 
has 2 subscales. Private self-consciousness is assessed with 
10 items (eg, “I’m always trying to figure myself  out”), 
and public self-consciousness is assessed with 7 items (eg. 
“I’m self-conscious about the way I look”). Each item is 
1284
D. Freeman et al
rated on a 5-point scale (0 = extremely uncharacteristic, 
5  =  extremely uncharacteristic). Higher scores indicate 
a greater degree of self-focus. We also included 3 visual 
analog measures of current attention (“Right now my 
attention is focused on my inner thoughts and feelings,” 
“Right now my attention is focused on how I appear to 
others,” and “Right now my attention is focussed on my 
surroundings”).
Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS).42 The BCSS, devel-
oped with nonclinical and psychosis groups, has 24 items 
assessing negative and positive beliefs about the self  and 
others each rated on a 5-point scale (0–4). Higher scores 
reflect greater endorsement of items. The subscale of 
interest in this study was negative beliefs about self, which 
contains 6 items (eg, “I am unloved,” “I am worthless,” 
and “I am weak”).
Analysis
Analyses were carried out using Stata Version 11.43 The 
first and second hypotheses were tested by calculating 
Pearson correlations between paranoia, anxiety, depres-
sion, and the cognitive processes. The third hypothesis 
was tested by carrying out partial correlations between 
paranoia and the cognitive processes, allowing for anxi-
ety and depression. A  mediation analysis was not con-
ducted because the study was cross-sectional. All tests 
were two tailed.
Results
Basic Demographic and Clinical Information
The mean age of the sample (N  =  130) was 41.1  years 
(SD  =  11.6), with 82 men and 48 women. The ethnici-
ties of the sample were white (n = 79), black Caribbean 
(n  =  15), black African (N  =  12), black Other (n  =  4), 
Asian (n = 6), and other (n = 14). Common factors for 
this patient group were the majority were single (n = 92) 
and not currently working (n = 119).
The diagnoses by the clinical teams of  the partici-
pants were schizophrenia (n = 111), delusional disorder 
(n = 7), schizo-affective disorder (n = 9), and psychotic 
disorder (n = 1). Almost all participants (n = 121) were 
currently taking antipsychotic medication. The mean 
length of  illness was 14.2 years (SD = 10.3). From the 
SAPS ratings, 119 were experiencing persecutory delu-
sions, 87 were experiencing auditory hallucinations, and 
20 were experiencing grandiose delusions. The mean 
score for state paranoia was 163.9 (SD = 147.0). The full 
range of  scores from 0 to 500 were reported for state 
paranoia, with 19 individuals scoring zero and 3 individ-
uals reporting 500. The state paranoia score positively 
correlated with the SAPS persecutory delusions item, 
r = .38, P < .001.
Hypothesis 1: Association of Paranoia With Anxiety 
and Depression
The mean BAI score was 21.9 (SD  =  13.1), with 24 
patients in the nonanxious range, 33 in the mild anxi-
ety range, 38 in the moderate range, and 33 in the severe 
anxiety range. The mean BDI score was 25.7 (SD = 13.7), 
with 29 patients in the minimal depression range, 20 in 
the mild range, 30 in the moderate range, and 51 in the 
severe depression range. State paranoia positively corre-
lated with levels of anxiety, r = .38, P < .001, and depres-
sion, r = .37, P < .001. Levels of anxiety and depression 
were significantly associated, P = .62, P < .001.
Hypothesis 2: Associations of Paranoia With Affective 
Processes
The associations of paranoia with the cognitive-affective 
processes are shown in table 1. It can be seen that higher 
levels of state paranoia were associated with higher rat-
ings of anticipation of threat to the self, negative inter-
pretations of ambiguous events, private and public 
self-consciousness, and negative ideas about the self. 
Paranoia was unrelated to anticipating positive or neu-
tral events occurring to the self  or to any type of event 
happening to another person, ie, there was a specific 
association of paranoia with anticipating negative events 
occurring to the self. The self-focus visual analog scales 
supported the association of self-consciousness with state 
paranoia, but there was also an association of paranoia 
with being focused upon the surroundings.
Hypothesis 3: Links Between Paranoia and Affective 
Processing Are Explained by Affect
In table 1, it can be seen that anxiety and depression were 
also associated with the cognitive-affective processes. The 
associations of state paranoia with the cognitive-affective 
processes were tested when controlling for the levels of 
anxiety and depression. It can be seen that the associa-
tions with threat anticipation, negative interpretations, 
private self-consciousness, attention on inner thoughts, 
attention on surroundings, and negative ideas about 
the self, no longer remained significant. Only the asso-
ciations of state paranoia with public self-consciousness 
and attention on appearance to others remain significant 
when controlling for affect.
Discussion
Anxiety, depression, and related cognitive processing were 
examined in a large sample of patients with delusions in 
the context of schizophrenia. A straightforward finding 
should not be overlooked; significant levels of anxiety and 
depression were very common in patients with delusions, 
with greater than two-thirds of the sample reporting mod-
erate to severe anxiety and/or depression. It reinforces 
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the view that emotional disorder is a clinical problem in 
its own right for patients with psychosis. However, our 
main aim was to test links of negative affect and affective 
processes to current paranoia. We replicate other studies 
in finding that the most anxious and depressed individu-
als also have the highest levels of paranoid thinking.5,20 
That is, negative affect and paranoid thinking appear to 
be linked. Perhaps, this is simply a consequence of the 
paranoid thinking, but longitudinal studies do not sup-
port such a view.12,22,23,34 The issue then shifts to explaining 
how affect influences delusional thinking.
The particular addition to the literature provided by 
this study is in showing that a range of cognitive-affective 
processing biases are active in people with current 
paranoid thinking, each of which is likely to exacerbate 
the problems. Greater anticipation of threatening events 
was clearly apparent, including negative interpretations 
of ambiguity. These biases will maintain a sense of 
current threat, defeat, and vulnerability. These are 
the sorts of biases addressed in traditional cognitive 
behavioral approaches in the generation of alternative 
explanations for events and testing out of paranoid ideas. 
There was also evidence of a hyperalertness, toward 
internal thoughts, how one was coming across, and the 
external environment. This attentional style will mean 
greater sensitivity to signs of potential threat and hence 
many more false alarms. The patients’ goal in any given 
situation is the detection of danger, rather than to focus 
on other aspects of activities or the environment. In 
short, danger will always be in mind. Shifting attentional 
focus is likely to be a crucial target of successful clinical 
interventions, linked to the observation that patients feel 
much less paranoid when engaged in meaningful activity. 
Behavioral tests of the differences between maintaining 
an internal focus of attention compared with an external 
focus of attention are very useful in cognitive therapy. We 
also confirmed the association of negative ideas about 
the self  with paranoia.34,44 Individuals who feel the least 
confident of themselves will see themselves as vulnerable 
and hence potential targets of hostility. It is not difficult 
to envisage how these processing biases may arise from 
the adverse social factors associated with psychosis.16,17,45 
Our view is that reducing negative ideas about the 
self  and encouraging more positive views will lead to 
improvements in levels of paranoia.
The strengths of this study are the size of the clinical 
group, the range of biases studied, and the links made 
with the current experience of persecutory thinking. 
Testing the patients on 4 affective processes (threat antic-
ipation, interpretation of ambiguity, self-focus, negative 
ideas about self) meant there was no reliance on a single 
task. However, the key limitation is the cross-sectional 
Table 1. Correlations Between Paranoia, Anxiety, Depression, and the Cognitive Processes
Variable State Paranoia Anxiety Depression
State Paranoia (Partial 
Correlation, Allowing for 
Anxiety and Depression)
Threat anticipation—self .21* .43*** .49*** .02
P = .020 P < .001 P < .001 P = .815
Neutral anticipation—self .10 .19* .04 .06
P = .280 P = .040 P = .640 P = .537
Positive anticipation—self −.00 −.11 −.27** .09
P = .960 P = .243 P = .003 P = .328
Threat anticipation—other .06 .27** .17 −.039
P = .545 P = .003 P = .068 P = .673
Neutral anticipation—other .02 .13 .01 −.01
P = .821 P = .172 P = .897 P = .939
Positive anticipation—other .01 .14 .11 −.06
P = .946 P = .120 P = .229 P = .549
Negative interpretation .19* .38*** .45*** −.00
P = .028 P < .001 P < .001 P = .978
Private self-consciousness .21* .14 .18* .15
P = .021 P = .118 P = .047 P = .089
Public self-consciousness .23** .15 .09 .20*
P = .009 P = .094 P = .317 P = .029
My attention is focused on my 
inner thoughts and feelings
.24** .33*** .24** .12
P = .007 P < .001 P = .006 P = .170
My attention is focused on how  
I appear to others
.31*** .16 .14 .26**
P < .001 P = .066 P = .107 P = .003
My attention is focused on my 
surroundings
.19* .15 .10 .15
P = .027 P = .083 P = .265 P = .090
Negative ideas about the self .25** .46*** .65*** .01
P = .004 P < .001 P < .001 P = .882
*P < .05, **P < .01, ***P < .001.
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nature of the link made between affect and paranoia. 
It could not be determined whether the affective biases 
contribute to the future occurrence of paranoia, how-
ever plausible this might seem. It was also not possible 
to examine whether the cognitive processes are media-
tors of the links between negative affect and paranoia. 
Longitudinal study of these processes would be especially 
helpful. We did not alter significance levels for multiple 
testing, ascribing to the view that “simply describing 
what tests of significance have been performed, and why, 
is generally the best method of dealing with multiple 
comparisons.”46 It was shown that a bias in anticipa-
tion of events only occurred for threatening and not for 
positive or neutral events; it would be helpful in future 
studies to examine different types of threatening events 
(eg, social and nonsocial situations) in order to assess the 
generalization of threat anticipation. It would also be 
valuable to examine the influence of affective processes 
in relation to delusional subtypes.47 Other affective pro-
cesses, for instance, worry,12 emotion regulation,48 and 
interpersonal sensitivity33 have recently been investigated 
in relation to paranoid thinking, and future work needs 
to identify those that are key to understanding and there-
fore important to target in treatment. Our view is that 
treating emotional dysfunction in patients should lead 
to reductions in psychotic experiences, and this requires 
clinical evaluation.49,50
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